Lars Gyllenhaal
Writing
2 min read

The Stack Is the Problem

At some point during most assessments I conduct, someone explains the security tools they are using. The list is usually long. There is a WAF, an IDS, a SIEM, a vulnerability scanner, a secrets manager, and something described as "a zero-trust initiative." The person explaining this is waiting for a reaction that suggests these choices confer some protection.

They do not, independently. Tools that are not configured correctly are worse than the absence of tools, because they produce false signal. A WAF with rules that have not been reviewed in eighteen months is a document that says you have a WAF. The SIEM that generates four thousand alerts a day and has two analysts looking at it for two hours a week is a liability, not an asset. The vulnerability scanner that has been running on a quarterly schedule against a network that changes daily is reading from an outdated map.

The stack is not the problem in the sense that the tools are bad. Some of them are fine. The stack is the problem in the sense that the stack has become a substitute for the thinking that the stack was supposed to support. The question is not what tools you have. The question is what your actual threat surface is, what controls you would need to reduce it meaningfully, and whether the things you have deployed constitute those controls or constitute the appearance of those controls.

Most stacks, examined carefully, constitute the appearance.